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1. INTRODUCTION 
A mysterious fatal disease strikes a large minority of the population. 
The disease is incurable, but an expensive drug can keep victims alive. Con ... 
gress decides that the drug should be given to those whose lives can be 
extended longest, which only a few specialists can predict. The experts work 
around the clock searchlng for a cure; allocating the drug is a new chore they 
would rather avoid. . 
In research on decision making there are two views about such experts. The 
views suggest different techno]ogies for modeJing experts' decisions so that 
they can do productive research rather than make predictions. One view, 
which emerges from behavioral research on decision making, is skeptical 
about the experts. Data suggest that a wide range of experts like our hypotheti-
ca1 specialists are not much better predictors than Jess expert physicians, or 
interns. Furthennore, this view suggests a simple technology for replacing 
experts - a simple linear regression model (perhaps using medica] judgments 
as inputs). The regression does not mimic the thought process of an expert, 
but it proDa bJy makes more accurate predictions than an expert does. 
The second view, stemming from research in cognitive science, suggests that 
expertise is a rare skill that develops only after much instruction, practice, and 
experience. The cognition of experts is more sophisticated than that of nov-
ices; this sophistication is presumed to produce better predictions. This view 
suggests a model that strives to mimic the decision policies of experts - an 
"expert (or knowledge-based) system" containing lists of rules experts use in 
judging longevity. An expert system tries to match, not exceed, the perfor-
mance of the expert it represents. 
In this chapter we describe and integrate these two perspectives. Integra-
tion comes from realizing that the behavioral and cognitive science ap-
proaches have different goals: Whereas behavioral decision theory empha-
sizes the performance of experts, cognitive science usually emphasizes differ-
ences in experts' processes (E. Johnson, 1988). 
A few caveats are appropriate. Our review is selective; it is meant to empha-
size the differences between expert performance and process. The generic 
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decision-malting task we describe usually consists of repeated predictions, 
based on the same set of observable variables, about a complicated outcome -
graduate school success, financial performance, health - that is rather unpre-
dictable. For the sake of brevity, we shall not discuss other important tasks 
such as probability estimation or revision, inference, categorization, or trade-
offs among attributes, costs, and benefits. 
The literature we review is indirectly related to the well-known "heuristics 
and biases" approach (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Our theme 
is that experts know a lot but predict poorly. Perhaps their knowledge is 
biased, if it comes from judgment heuristics or they use heuristics in applying 
it. We can only speculate about this possibility (as we do later, in a few places) 
until further research draws the connection more c1early. 
For our purposes, an expert is a person who is experienced at making 
predictions in a domain and has some professional or social·credentia1s. The 
experts described here are no slouches: They are psychologists, doctors, aca-
demics, accountants, gamblers, and parole officers who are intelligent, well 
paid, and often proud. We draw no special distinction between them and 
extraordinary experts, or experts acc1aimed by peers (cf. Shanteau, 1988). We 
suspect that our general conclusions wou1d apply to more elite populations of 
experts,l but clearly there have been too few studies of these populations. 
The chapter is organized as follows: In section 2 we review what we cur-
rently know about how \vel] experts perform decision tasks, then in section 3 
we review recent work on expert decision processes. Section 4 integrates the 
views described in sections 2 and 3. Then we examine the implications of this 
work for decision research and for the study of expertise in general. 
2. PERFORMANCE OF EXPERTS 
Most of the research in the behavioral decision-making approach to 
expertise has been organized around performance of experts. A natural mea-
sure of expert performance is predictive accuracy; later, we discuss other 
aspects. Modern research on expert accuracy emanates from Sarbin (1944), 
who drew an analogy between clinical reasoning and statistical (or Uactuar-
ia]") judgment. His data, and the influential book by Meehl (1954), estab-
lished that in many clinical prediction tasks experts were less accurate than 
simple formulas based on observable variables. As Dawes and Corrigan 
(1974, p. 97) wrote, "the statistical analysis was thought to provide a floor to 
which the judgment of the experienced clinician could be compared. The floor 
turned out to be a ceiling." 
I While presenting a research seminar discussing the application of linear models, Robyn Dawes 
reported Einhorn's (1972) classic finding that three expertst judgments of Hodgkin's disease 
severity were uncorrelated with actual severity (measured by how long patients lived). One 
seminar participant asked Dawes what would happen if a certain famous physician were studied. 
The questioner was sure that Dr. So-and-so makes accurate judgments. Dawes called Einhorn; 
the famous doctor turned out to be subject 2. 
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2.1. A language fOT quantitative studies of perfonnance 
In many studies, linear regression techniques are used to construct 
statistical models of expert judgments (and to improve those judgments) and 
distinguish components of judgment accuracy and error.2 These techniques 
are worth reviewing briefly because they provide a useful language for discuss-
ing accuracy and its components. 
A subject's judgment (denoted Ys) depends on a set of informational cues 
(denoted Xl' .. . ,Xn)' The cues could be measured objectively (college 
grades) or subjectively by experts (evaluating letters of recommendation). 
The actual environmental outcome (or "criterion") (denoted Ye) is also as-
sumed to be a function of the same cues. 
1n the comparisons to be described, several kinds of regressions are com-
monly used. One such regression, the "actuarial" model, predicts outcomes Y e 
based on observable cues Xi" The model naturally separates Ye into a predict-
able component Ye, a linear combination3 of cues weighted by regression 
coefficients bi•e, and an unpredictable error component Ze' That is, 
Ye = 2: bi,eX; + ze (actuarial model) (1) 
=Ye + Ze 
Figure 8.1 il1ustrates these relationships, as well as others that we shall discuss 
subsequently. 
2.2. Experts versus actuarial models 
The initial studies compared expert judgments with those of actuarial 
models. That is, the correlation between the expert judgment Ys and the 
outcome Ye (often denoted '0' for "achievement") was compared with the 
correlation between the moders predicted outcome Ye and the actual outcome 
Y e (denoted Re). 4 
Meehl (1954) reviewed about two dozen studies. Cross-validated actuarial 
models outpredicted clinical judgment (i.e., Re was greater than 'a) in all but 
one study. Now there have been about a hundred studies; experts did better in 
only a handful of them (mostly medical tasks in which well-developed theory 
outpredicted limited statistical experience; see Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 
2 Many regression studies use the general &lIens mode)" proposed by Egon Bnmswik (1952) and 
extended by Hammond (1955) and others. The lens mode] shows the interconnection between 
two systems: an ecology or environment, and a person making judgments. The notation in the 
text is mostly lens-model terminology. 
l Although the functions relating cues to the judgment and the outcome can be of any form, linear 
relationships are most often used, because they explain judgments and outcomes surprisingly 
well, even when outcomes are known to be nonlinear functions of the cues (Dawes & Corrigan, 
1974). 
4 The correlation between the actuarial-model prediction and the outcome Ye is the square root of 
the regression R2, and is denoted R,. A more practical measure of actuarial·model accuracy is 
the "cross-validated" correlation. when regression weights derived on one sample are used to 
predict a new sample of Y, values. 
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Figure 8.1. A quantitative language for describing decision performance. 
1989). The studies have covered many different tasks - university admissions, 
recidivism or violence of criminals, clinical pathology, medica] diagnosis, fi-
nancial investment, sports, weather forecasting. Thirty years after his book 
was published, Meehl (1986, p. 373) suggested that "there is no controversy in 
social science that sho\vs such a large body of qualitative]y diverse studies 
coming out so uniformly in the same direction." 
2.3. Experts versus improper models 
Despite their superiority to clinical judgment, actuarial models are 
difficult to use because the outcome Ye must be measured, to provide the raw 
data for deriving regression weights. It can be costly or time-consuming to 
measure outcomes (for recidivism or medical diagnosis), or definitions of 
outcomes can be ambiguous (What is "success" for a Ph.D.?). And past 
outcomes must be used to fit cross-validated regression weights to predict 
current outcomes, which makes models vulnerable to changes in true coeffi-
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cients over time. Therefore, "improper"5 models - which derive regression 
weights without using Ye - might be more useful and nearly as accurate as 
proper actuarial models. 
In one improper method, regression weights are derived from the Ys judg-
ments themselves; then cues are weighted by the derived weights and 
summed. This procedure amounts to separating the overall expert judgment 
Ys into two components, a modeled component Ys and a residua] component 
zs' and using only the modeled component Ys as a prediction.6 That is, 
Ys = ~b;sX; + Zs 
= Ys + Zs 
(2) 
If the discarded residual Zs is mostly random error, the modeled component Ys 
will correlate more highly with the outcome than will the overall judgment, 
Ys ' (In standard terminology, the correlation between Yj and Ye, denoted Tm, 
win be higher than Ta') 
This method is ca1led "bootstrapping" because it can improve judgments 
without any outcome infonnation: It pulls experts up by their bootstraps. 
Bowman (1963) first showed that bootstrapping improved judgments in pro-
duction scheduling; similar improvements were found by Goldberg (1970) in 
clinical predictions based on MMPI scores7 and by Dawes (1971) in graduate 
admissions. A cross-study comparison showed that bootstrapping works very 
generaJly, but usually adds only a small increment to predictive accuracy 
(Camerer, 1981a). Table 8.1 shows some of those results. Accuracy can be 
usefully dissected with the lens-model equation, an identity relating several 
interesting correlations. Einhorn's (1974) version of the equation states 
Ta = T mRs + rA1 - R:)1h (3) 
where R; is the bootstrapping model R2 (how closely the judge resembles the 
linear model), and rz is the correlation between bootstrapping-model residuals 
Zs and outcomes Ye (the "residual validity"). If the residuals Zs represent only 
random error in weighing and combining the cues, rz will be close to zero. In 
this case, r m will certainly be larger than Ta, and because Rs S 1, bootstrapping 
will improve judgments. But even if rz is greater than zero (presumably be-
cause residuals contain some infonnation that is correlated with outcomes), 
bootstrapping works unless 
.) By contrast., actuarial models often are called "optimal linear models." because by definition no 
linear combination of the cues can predict Ye more accurately. 
6 Of course. such an explanation is "paramorphic" (Hoffman, 1960): It describes judgments in a 
purely statistical way, as if experts were weighing and combining cues in their heads; the process 
they use might be quite different. However, Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, and Kleinmuntz (1979) 
argued persuasively that the paramorphic regression approach might capture process indirectly. 
7 Because suggested ?vIinnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (lvlMPI) cutoffs were origi· 
nally created by statistical analysis, it may seem unsurprising that a statistical model beats a 
judge who tries to mimic it. But the model combines scores linearly, whereas judges typically use 
various scores in configura] nonlinear combinations. 
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Tz ::: Tm ( 1 - Rs) 1h 1 + Rs (4) 
For Rs = .6 (a reasonable value; see Table 8.1), residual validity Tz must be 
about half as large as model accuracy for experts to outperform their own 
bootstrapping models. This rarely occurs. 
When there are not many judgments, compared with the number of vari-
ables, the regression weights in a bootstrapping model cannot be estimated 
reliably. Then one can simply weight the cues equally8 and add them up. 
Dawes and Corrigan (1974) showed that equal weights worked remarkably 
well in several empirical comparisons (the accuracies of some of these are 
shown in the column Tew' in Table 8.1). Simulations show that equal weighting 
generally works as well as least squares estimation of weights unless there are 
twenty times as many observations as predictors (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975). 
As Dawes and Corrigan (1974) put it, "the wh01e trick is to decide what 
variables to look at and then to know how to add" (p. 105). 
2.4. Training and experience: experts versus novices 
Studies have shown that expert judgments are less accurate than 
those of statistical models of varying sophistication. Two other useful compari-
sons are those between experts and novices and between experienced and 
inexperienced experts. 
Garb (1989) reviewed more than fifty comparisons of judgments by clinical 
psychologists and novices. The comparisons suggest that ( academic) training 
helps but additional experience does not. Trained clinicians and graduate 
students were more accurate than novices (typically untrained students, or 
secretaries) in using the MMPI to judge personality disorders. Students did 
better and better with each year of graduate training. The effect of training 
was not large (novices might classify 28% correctly, and experts 40%), but it 
existed in many studies. Training, however, generally did not help in interpret-
ing projective tests (drawings, Rorschach inkblots, and sentence-completion 
tests); using such tests, clinical psychologists probably are no more accurate 
than auto mechanics or insurance salesmen. 
Training has some effects on accuracy, but experience has almost none. In 
judging personality and neurophysiological disorders, for example, clinicians 
do no better than advanced graduate students. Among experts with varying 
amounts of experience, the correlations between amount of clinical experience 
and accuracy are roughly zero. Libby and Frederick (1989) found that experi-
ence improved the accuracy of auditors' explanations of audit errors only 
slightly (although even inexperienced auditors were better than students). 
In medical judgments too, training helps, but experience does not. Gustaf-
8 Of course, variables must be standardized by dividing them by their sample standard deviations. 
Otherwise, a variable with a wide range would account for more than its share of the variation in 
the equally weighted sum. 
Table 8.1. Examples of regression-study results 
Mean accuracy of: 
Model fit .. Judge .. 
Study Prediction task Rs 'a 
Goldberg (1970) Psychosis vs. neurosis .77 .28 
Dawes (1971) Ph. D. admissions .78 .19 
Einhorn (1972) Disease severity .41 .01 
Libby (1976)b Bankruptcy .79 .50 
Wiggens & Kohen (1971) Grades .85 .33 
a All are cross-validated Re except Einhorn (1972) and Libby (1976). 
bFigures cited are recalculations by Goldberg (1976). 
Source: Adapted from Camerer (1981a) and Dawes & Corrigan (1974). 
Bootstrapping Bootstrapping Equalwweight Actuarial 
model, residuals, model, model ,0 
'm 't 'ew Re 
.31 .07 .34 .45 
.25 .01 .48 .38 
.13 .06 n.a. .35 
.53 .13 n.a . .67 
.50 . 01 .60 .57 
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son (1963) found no difference between residents and surgeons in predicting 
the length of hospital stay after surgery. Kundel and LaFollette (1972) re-
ported that novices and first-year medical students were unable to detect 
lesions from radiographs of abnormal lungs, but fourth-year students (who 
had had some training in radiography) were as good as full-time radiologists. 
These tasks usually have a rather low performance ceiling. Graduate train-
ing may provide all the experience one requires to approach the ceiling. But 
the myth that additional experience helps is persistent. One of the psychology 
professors who recently revised the MMPI said that "anybody who can count 
can score it [the MMPI], but it takes expertise to interpret it." (Philadelphia 
Inquirer, 1989). Yet Goldberg's (1970) data suggest that the only expertise 
required is the ability to add scores with a hand calculator or paper and pencil. 
If a small amount of training can make a person as accurate as an experi-
enced clinical psychologist or doctor, as the data imply, then lightly trained 
paraprofessionals could replace heavily trained experts for many routine kinds 
of diagnoses. Citing Shortliffe, Buchanan, and Feigenbaum (1979), Garb 
(1989) suggested that "intelligent high school graduates, selected in large part 
because of poise and warmth of personality, can provide competent medical 
care for a limited range of problems when guided by protocols after only 4 to 8 
weeks of training. " 
It is conceivable that outstanding experts are more accurate than models 
and graduate students in some tasks. For instance, in Goldberg's (1959) study 
of organic brain damage diagnoses, a well-known expert (who worked very 
slowly) was right 83% of the time, whereas other Ph.D. clinical psychologists 
got 65 % right. Whether such extraordinary expertise is a reliable phenome-
non or a statistical fluke is a matter for further research. 
2.5. Expert calibration 
Whereas experts may predict less accurately than models, and only 
slightly more accurately than novices, they seem to have better self-insight 
about the accuracy of their predictions. Such self-insight is called "calibra .. 
tion." Most people are poorly calibrated, offering erroneous reports of the 
quality of their predictions, and these reports systematically err in the direc-
tion of overconfidence: When they say a class of events are 80% likely, those 
events occur less than 80% of the time (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 
1977). There is some evidence that experts are less overconfident than nov-
ices. For instance, Levenberg (1975) had subjects look at "kinetic family 
drawings" to detect whether the chi1dren who drew them were normal. The 
results were, typically, a smal1 victory for training: Psychologists and secretar-
ies got 66% and 61 % right, respectively (a cointlip would get half right). Of 
these cases about which subjects were "positively certain," the psychologists 
and secretaries got 76% and 59% right, respectively. The psychologists were 
better caHbrated than novices - they used the phrase "positively certain" 
more cautiously (and appropriately) - but they were still overconfident. 
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Better calibration of experts has also been found in some other studies 
(Garb, 1989). Expert calibration is better than novice calibration in bridge 
(Keren, in press), but not in blackjack (Wagenaar & Keren, 1985). Doctors' 
judgments of pneumonia and skull fracture are badly calibrated (Christensen-
Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981; DeSmet, Fryback, & Thornbury, 1979). 
Weather forecasters are extremely well calibrated (Murphy & Winkler, 1977). 
Experiments with novices sho\ved that training improved calibration, reduc .. 
ing extreme overconfidence in estimating probabilities and numerical quanti-
ties (Lichtenstein et al., 1977) 
2.6. Summary: expert performance 
The depressing conclusion from these studies is that expert judgments 
in most clinical and medical domains are no more accurate than those of 
Hghtly trained novices. (We know of no comparable reviews of other domains, 
but we suspect that experts are equally unimpressive in most aesthetic, com-
mercial, and physical judgments.) And expert judgments have been worse 
than those of the simplest statistical models in virtually all domains that have 
been studied. Experts are sometimes less overconfident than novices, but not 
always. 
3. EXPERT DECISION PROCESSES 
The picture of expert performance painted by behavioral decision theo-
rists is unflattering. Why are experts predicting so badly? We know that many 
experts have special cognitive and memory skills (Chase & Simon, 1973; Erics-
son & Polson, 1988; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). Do expert 
decision-makers have similar strategies and skil1? If so, why don't they perfonn 
better? Three kinds of evidence help answer these questions: process analyses 
of expert judgments, indirect analyses using regression models, and laboratory 
studies in which subjects become "artificial experts" in a simple domain. 
3.1. Direct evidence: process analyses of experts 
The rules and cues experts use can be discovered by using process 
tracing techniques - protocol analysis and monitoring of information acquisi-
tion. Such studies have yielded consistent conclusions across a diverse set of 
domains. 
Search is contingent. If people think like a regression model, weighting cues 
and adding them, then cue search will be simple - the same variables will be 
examined, in the same sequence, in every case. Novices behave that way. But 
experts have a more active pattern of contingent search: Subsets of variables 
are considered in each case, in different sequences. Differences between nov· 
ice and expert searches have been found in studies of financial analysts 
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(Bouman, 1980; E. Johnson, 1988), auditors (Bedard & Mock, 1989), gradu-
ate admissions (E. Johnson, 1980), neurologists (Kleinmuntz, 1968), and phy-
sicians (Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978; P. Johnson, Hassebrock, Duran, 
& Moller, 1982). 
Experts search less. A common finding in studies of expert cognition is that 
information processing is Jess costly for experts than for novices. For example, 
expert waiters (Ericsson & Chase, 1981) and chess players (Chase & Simon, 
1973) have exceptional memory s1011s. Their memory allows more efficient 
encoding of task-specific information; if they wanted to, experts could search 
and sit cheapJy through more information. But empirical studies show that 
experts use less information than novices, rather than more, in auditing 
(Bedard, 1989; Bedard & Mock, 1989), financial analysis (Bouman, 1980; E. 
Johnson, 1988), and product choice (Bettman & Park, 1980; Brucks, 1985; E. 
Johnson & Russo, 1984). 
Experts use more knowledge. Experts often search contingently, for limited 
sets of variables, because they know a great deal about their domains 
(Bouman, 1980; Elstein et al., 1978; Libby & Frederick, 1989). Experts per-
form a kind of diagnostic reasoning, matching the cues in a specific case to 
prototypes in a casual brand of hypothesis testing. Search is contingent be-
cause different sets of cues are required for each hypothesis test. Search is 
limited because only a small set of cues are relevant to a particular hypothesis. 
3.2. Indirect evidence: dissecting residuals 
The linear regression models described in section 2 provide a simple 
way to partition expert judgment into components. The bootstrapped judg-
ment is a linear combination of observed cues; the residual is everything else. 
By dissecting the residual statistically, we can learn how the decision process 
experts use deviates from the simple linear combination of cues. It deviates in 
three ways. 
Experts often use configural choice rules .. In configural rules, the impact of one 
variable depends on the values of other variables. An example is found in 
c1inicallore on interpretation of the MMPI. Both formal instruction and verbal 
protocols of experienced clinicians give rules that note the state of more than 
one variable. A nice example is given by an early rule-based system constructed 
by Kleinmuntz (1968) using clinicians' verba] protocols. Many of the rules in 
the system reflect such configural reasoning: "Call maladjusted if Pa 2:: 70 unless 
M,s 6, and K ~ 65. ,., Because linear regression models weight each cue indepen-
dently, configural rules will not be captured by the linear form, and the effects 
of configural judgment will be reflected in the regression residual. 
Experts use "broken-leg cues." Cues that are rare but highly diagnostic often 
are called broken-leg cues, from an examp]e cited by Meehl (1954; pp. 24-
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25): A clinician is trying to predict whether or not Professor A will go to the 
movies on a given night. A regression model predicts that the professor will 
go, but the clinician knows that the professor recently broke his leg. The cue 
"broken leg" probably will get no weight 'in a regression model of past cases, 
because broken legs are rare. 9 But the clinician can confidently predict that 
the professor will not go to the movies. The clinician's recognition of the 
broken-leg cue, which is missing from the regression model, will be captured 
by the residual. Note that while the frequency of anyone broken-leg cue is 
rare, in "the mass of cases, there may be many (different) rare kinds of 
factors" (Meehl, 1954, p. 25). 
Note how the use of configural rmes and broken-leg cues is consistent with 
the process data described in section 3. To use configural rules, experts must 
search for different sets of cues in different sequences. Experts also can use 
their knowledge about cue diagnosticity to focus on a limited number of highly 
diagnostic broken-leg cues. For example, in E. lohnson's (1988) study of 
financial analysts, experts were much more accurate than novices because 
they could interpret the impact of news events simi1ar to broken-leg cues. 
Experts weight cues inconsistently and make e"ors in combining them. When 
experts do combine cues linearly, any inconsistencies in weighting cues, and 
errors in adding them, win be reflected in the regression residual. Thus, if 
experts use configura] rules and broken-leg cues, their effects will be con-
tained in the residuals of a Hnear bootstrapping model. The residuals also 
contain inconsistencies and error. By comparing residua] variance and test-
retest reliabiJity, Camerer (1981b) estimated that only about 40% of the vari-
ance in residuals was error,lO and 60% was systematic use of configural rules 
and broken-leg cues. (Those fractions were remarkably consistent across dif-
ferent studies.) The empirical correlation between residuals and outcomes, rz ' 
however, averaged only about .05 (Camerer, 1981a) over a wider range of 
studies. Experts are using configural rules and broken-leg cues systematically, 
but they are not highly correlated with outcomes. Of course, there may be 
some domains in which residuals are more valid. ll 
3.3. Artificial experts 
A final kind of process evidence comes from Hartificial experts," sub-
jects who spend much time in an experimental environment trying to induce 
accurate judgmental rules. A lot of this research belongs to the tradition 
9 Unless a broken leg has occurred in the sample used to derive regression weights, the cue 
"'broken leg" wilJ not vary and will get no regression weight. 
10 These data correct the presumption in the early bootstrapping literature (e.g., Dawes. 1971; 
Goldberg, 1970) that residuals were entirely human error. 
II A recent study with sales forecasters showed a higher Tz• around .2 (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990). 
Even though their residuals were quite accurate y the best forecasters only did about as well as 
the linear model. In a choice between models and experts, models will win, but a mechanical 
combination of the two is better still: Adding b£?otstrapping residuals to an actuarial model 
increased predictive accuracy by about 10%. 
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of multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL) experiments that stretches back 
decades, with the pessimistic conclusion that rule induction is difficult, particu-
larly when outcomes have random error. We shall give three more recent 
examples that combine process analysis with a rule induction task. 
Several studies have used protocol analysis to determine what it is that 
artificial experts have learned. Perhaps the most ambitious attempts to study 
extended learning in complex environments were Klayman's studies of cue 
discovery (Klayman, 1988; Klayman & Ha, 1985): Subjects looked at a com-
plex computer display consisting of geometric shapes that affected the dis-
tance traveled by ray traces from one point on the display to another. The true 
rule for travel distance was determined by a complex linear model consisting 
of seven factors that varied in salience in the display. None of Klayman's 
subjects induced the correct rule over 14 half-hour sessions, but their perfor-
mances improved steadily. Some improvement came from discovering correct 
cues (subjects correctly identified only 2.83 of 7 cues, on average). Subjects 
who systematically experimented, by varying one cue and holding others 
fixed, learned faster and better than others. Because the cues varied greatly in 
how much they affected distance, it was important to weight them differently, 
but more than four-fifths of the rules stated by subjects did not contain any 
numerical elements (such as weights) at all. In sum, cue discovery played a 
clear role in developing expertise in this task, but learning about the relative 
importance of cues did not. 
In a study by Meyer (1987), subjects learned which attributes of a hypotheti .. 
cal metal alloy led to increases in its hardness. As in Klayman's study, subjects 
continued to learn rules over a long period of time. The true rule for hardness 
(which was controlled by the experimenter) was linear, but most subjects 
induced configural rules. Subjects made only fairly accurate predictions, be ... 
cause the true linear rule could be mimicked by nonlinear rules. Learning 
(better performance) consisted of adding more elaborate and baroque configu-
ral rules, rather than inducing the true linear relationships. 
In a study by Camerer (1981b), subjects tried to predict simulated wheat-
price changes that depended on two variables and a large interaction between 
them (i.e., the true rule was configural). Subjects did learn to use the interac-
tion in their judgments, but with so much error that a linear bootstrapping 
model that omitted the interaction was more accurate. Similarly, in E. John-
son's (1988) financial-analyst study, even though expert analysts used highly 
diagnostic news events, their judgments were inferior to those of a simple 
linear model. 
3.4. Summary: expert decision processes 
Studies of decision processes indicate that expert decision makers are 
like experts in other domains: They know more and use their knowledge to 
guide search for small subsets of information, which differ with each case. 
Residuals from bootstrapping models and learning experiments also show that 
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experts use configural rules and cues not captured by linear models (but these 
are not always predictive). The process evidence indicates that experts know 
more, but what they know does not enable them to outpredict simple statisti-
cal rules. Why not? 
4. RECONCILING THE PERFORMANCE AND PROCESS 
VIEWS OF EXPERTISE 
One explanation for the process-performance paradox is that predic-
tion is only one task that experts must perform; they may do better on other 
tasks. Later we shall consider this explanation further. Another explanation is 
that experts are quick to develop configura] rules that often are inaccurate, 
but they keep these rules or switch to equaUy poor ones. (The same may be 
true of broken-leg cues.) This argument raises three questions, which we 
address in tum: Why do experts develop configural rules? Why are configural 
ru1es often inaccurate? Why do inaccurate con figural rules persist? 
4.1" Why do experts develop configural rules? 
Configural rules are easier. Consider two common classes of configural rules, 
conjuDctive (hire Hope for the faculty if she has glowing letters of recommen-
dation, good grades, and an interesting thesis) and disjunctive (draft Michael 
for the basketball team jf he can play guard or forward or center extremely 
well). Configural rules are easy because they bypass the need to trade off 
different cues (Are recommendations better predictors than grades?), avoid-
ing the cumbersome weighting and combination of information. Therefore, 
configural rules take much less effort than optimal ru1es and can yield nearly 
optimal choices (E. Johnson & Payne, 1985),12 
Besides avoiding difficult trade-offs, configura] rules require only a simple 
categorization of cue values. With conjunctive and disjunctive rules, one need 
only know whether or not a cue is above a cutoff; attention can be allocated 
economically to categorize the values of many cues crudely, rather than catego-
rizing only one or two cues precisely. 
Prior theory often suggests configural rules. In his study of wheat prices, 
Camerer (1981b) found that subjects could learn of the existence of a large 
configura1 interaction only when cue labels suggested the interaction a priori. 
Similarly, cue labels may cause subjects to learn configural rules where they 
are inappropriate, as in Meyer's (1987) study of alloy hardness. These prior 
beliefs about cue-outcome correlations often will be influenced by the "repre-
sentativeness" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) of cues to outcomes; the repre-
sentativeness heuristic will sometimes cause errors. 
12 Configural rules are especially useful for narrowing a large set of choices to a subset of 
candidates for further consideration. 
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Besides their cognitive ease and prior suggestion, complex configural rules 
are easy to learn because it is easy to weave a causal narrative around a 
configural theory. These coherent narratives cement a dependence between 
variables that is easy to express but may overweight these "causal" cues, at the 
cost of ignoring others. Linear combinations yield no such coherence. Meehl 
(1954) provides the fonowing example from clinicial psychology, describing 
the case of a woman who was ambivalent toward her husband. One night the 
woman came home from a movie alone. Then: 
Entering the bedroom, she was terrified to see, for a fraction of a second, a 
large black bird ("a raven, I guess") perched on her pillow next to her 
husband's head. . . . She recalls "vaguely, some poem we read in high 
schoo1." (p. 39) 
Meehl hypothesized that the woman's vision was a fantasy, based on the poem 
"The Raven" by Edgar Allen Poe: "The [woman's] fantasy is that like Poe's 
Lenore, she will die or at least go away and leave him [the husband] alone." 
Meehl was using a configural rule that gave more weight to the raven vision 
because the woman knew the Poe poem. A linear rule, simply weighting the 
dummy variables "raven" and "knowledge of Poe," yields a narrative that is 
much clumsier than Meehl's compelling analysis. Yet such a model might well 
pay attention to other factors, such as the woman's age, education, and so 
forth, which might also help explain her ambivalence. 
Configural rules can emerge naturally from trying to explain past cases. People 
learn by trying to fit increasingly sophisticated general rules to previous cases 
(Brehmer, 1980; Meyer, 1987). Complicated configura] rules offer plenty of 
explanatory flexibility. For example, a 6-variable model permits 15 two-way 
interactions, and a 10-variable model allows 45 interactions. I3 In sports, for 
instance, statistics are so plentiful and refined that it is easy to construct subtle 
"configuralities" when global rules fail. Bucky Dent was an average New York 
Yankee infielder, except in the World Series, where he played "above his 
head," hitting much better than predicted by his overall average. (The vari-
able "Dent" was not highly predictive of success, but adding the interaction 
UDent" x "Series" was.)14 Because people are reluctant to accept the possibil-
ity of random error (Einhorn, 1986), increasingly complicated configural ex ... 
planations are born. 
Inventing special cases is an important mechanism for learning in more 
13 A linear model with k cues has only k degrees of freedom, but the k variables offer k(k - 1)12 
multip1icative two-variable interactions (and lots of higher-order interactions). 
14 We cannot determine whether Dent was truly better in the World Series or just lucky in a 
limited number of Series appearances. Yet his success in "big games'· obviously influenced the 
Yankees' owner. George Steinbrenner (who has not otherwise distinguished himself as an 
expert decision-maker). He named Dent manager of the Yankees shortly after this conference 
was held. citing his ability as a player Uto come through when it mattered." Dent was later fired 
49 games into the season (18 wins, 31 losses), and the Yankees had the worst record in Major 
League basebal1 at the time. 
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deterministic environments, where it can be quite effective. The tendency of 
decision-makers to build special-case rules mirrors more adaptive processes of 
induction (e.g., Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986, chapter 3, esp. 
pp. 88-89) that can lead to increased accuracy. As Holland and associates 
pointed out, however, the validity of these mechanisms rests on the ability to 
check each specialization on many cases. In noisy domains like the ones we 
are discussing, there are few replications. It was unlikely, for example, that 
Dent would appear in many Wor1d Series, and even if he did, other "unique" 
circumstances (opposing pitching, injuries, etc.) could always yield further 
"explanatory" factors. 
In sum, configural rules- are appealing because they are easy to use, have 
plausib1e causal exp1anations, and offer many degrees of freedom to fit data .. 
Despite these advantages, configural rules may have a downfall, as detailed in 
the next section. 
4.2. Why are configural rules often inaccurate? 
One reason configural rules may be inaccurate is that whereas they are 
induced under specific and often rare conditions, they may well be applied to a 
1arger set of cases. Often, people induce such rules from observation, they will 
be overgeneralizing from a small sample (expecting the sample to be more 
"representative" of a population that it is - Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). This 
is illustrated by a verbal protocol recorded by a physician who was chair of a 
hospital's admissions committee for house staff, interns, and residents. Seeing 
an applicant from Wayne State who had very high board scores, the doctor 
recalled a promising applicant from the same school who had perfect board 
scores. Unfortunately, after being admitted, the prior aspirant had done poorly 
and left the program. The physician recalled this case and applied it to the new 
one: "We have to be quite careful with people from Wayne State with very high 
board scores. . . . We have had problems in the past." 
Configural rules may also be wrong because the implicit theories that under-
lie them are wrong. A large literature on "illusory correlation" contains many 
examples of variables that are thought to be correlated with outcomes (because 
they are similar) but are not. For example, most clinicians and novices think 
that people who see male features or androgynous figures in Rorschach ink-
blots are more likely to be homosexual. They are not (Chapman & Chapman, 
1967, 1969). A successful portfolio manager we know refused to buy stock in 
firms run by overweight CEOs, believing that control of one's weight and 
control of a firm are correlated. Because variables that are only illusorily corre-
lated with outcomes are likely to be used by both novices and experts, the small 
novice-expert difference suggests that illusory correlations may be common. 
Configural rules are also likely to be unrobust to small errors, or "brittle. "15 
IS Although the robustness of linear models is well established, we know of no analogous work on 
the un robustness of cpnfigural rules. 
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Linear models are extremely robust; they fit nonlinear data remarkably well 
(Yntema & Torgerson, 1961). That is why omitting a configural interaction 
from a bootstrapping model does not greatly reduce the accuracy of the 
model.16 In contrast, we suspect that small errors in measurement may have 
great impacts on configura} rules. For example, the conjunctive rule "require 
good grades and test scores" will lead to mistakes if a test score is not a 
predictor of success or if the cutoff for "good grades" is wrong; the linear rule 
that weights grades and scores and combines them is less vulnerable to either 
error. 
4.3. Why do inaccurate configural rules persist? 
One of the main lessons of decision research is that feedback is crucial 
for learning. Inaccurate configural rules may persist because experts who get 
slow, infrequent, or unclear feedback will not learn that their rules are wrong. 
When feedback must be sought, inaccurate rules may persist because people 
tend to search instinctively for evidence that will confirm prior theories 
(Klayman & Ha, 1985). Even when feedback is naturally provided, rather 
than sought, confirming evidence is more retrievable or "available" than 
disconfirming evidence (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The disproportionate 
search and recall of confirming instances will sustain experts' faith in inaccu-
rate configural rules. Even when evidence does disconfirm a particular rule, 
we suspect that the natural tendencies to construct such rules (catalogued 
earlier) will cause experts to refine their rules rather than discard them. 
4.4. Nonpredictive functions of expertise 
The thinking of experts is rich with subtle distinctions, novel catego-
ries, and complicated configura) rules for making predictions. We have given 
several reasons why such categories and rules might arise, and persist even if 
they are inaccurate. Our arguments provide one possible explanation why 
knowledgeable experts, paradoxically, are no better at making predictions 
than novices and simple models. 
Another explanation is that the knowledge that experts acquire as they 
learn may not be useful for making better predictions about important long-
range outcomes, but it may be useful for other purposes. Experts are indis-
pensable for measuring variables (Sawyer, 1966) and discovering new ones 
(E. Johnson, 1988). 
Furthermore, as experts learn, they may be able to make more kinds of 
predictions, even if they are no more accurate; we speculate that they mistake 
their increasing fertility for increasing accuracy. Taxi drivers know lots of 
a1ternative routes \vhen they see traffic on the Schuylkill Expressway (cf. 
16 Linear models are robust to nonlinearities provided the relationship between each predictor and 
outcome has the same direction for any values of the other predictors (although the relationsbip's 
magnitude will vary). This property is sometimes called "conditional mono tonicity. " 
The process-performance paradox in expert judgment 211 
Chase, 1983), and they probably can predict their speeds on those alternative 
routes better than a novice can. But can the experts predict whether there will 
be heavy traffic on the expressway better than a statistical mode] can (using 
time of day, day of week, and weather, for example)? We doubt it. 
There are also many social benefits of expertise that people can provide 
better than models can. Models can make occasional large mistakes that 
experts, having common sense, would know to avoid (Shanteau, 1988).17 
Experts can explain themselves better, and people usually fee] that an expert's 
intuitive judgments are fairer than those of a model (cf. Dawes, 1971). 
Some of these attitudes toward experts stem from the myth that experts are 
accurate predictors, or the hope that an expert will never err.1S Many of these 
social benefits should disappear with time, if people learn that models are 
better; until then, experts have an advantage. (Large corporations have 
learned: They use models in scoring credit risks, adjusting insurance claims, 
and other activities where decisions are routine and cost savings are large ~ 
Consumers do think that such rules are unfair, but the cost savings overwhelm 
their objections.) 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING 
EXPERT DECISION MAKING 
Our review produces a consistent, if depressing, picture of expert 
decision-makers. They are successful at generating hypotheses and inducing 
complex decision rules. The result is a more efficient search of the available 
information directed by goals and aided by the experts' superior store of 
knowledge. Unfortunately, their knowledge and rules have little impact on 
experts' performance. Sometimes experts are more accurate than novices 
(though not always), but they are rarely better than simple statistical models. 
An inescapable conclusion of this research is that experts do some things 
well and others poorly. Sawyer (1966) found that expert measurement of cues, 
and statistical combination of them, worked better than expert combination 
or statistical measurement. Techniques that combine experts' judgments 
about configural and broken-leg cues with actuarial models might improve 
perfonnance especially well (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; E. Johnson, 1988). 
Of course, expert performance relative to models depends critical1y on the 
17 This possibility has been stressed by Ken Hammond in discussions of analytical versus intuitive 
judgment (e~g., Hammond, Hamm. Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). For example, most of the 
unorthodox moves generated by the leading backgammon computer program (which beat a 
world champion in 1979) are stupid mistakes an expert would catch; a few are brilliant moves 
that might not occur to an expert. 
18 A model necessarily errs, by fixing regression coefficients and ignoring many variables. It 
"accepts error to make less error" (Einhorn, 1986). An expert, by changing regression coeffi-
cients and selecting variables, conceivably could be right every time. This difference is made 
dramatic by a medical example. A statistician developed a simple linear model to make routine 
diagnoses. Its features were printed on a card doct9rs could carry around; the card showed 
several cues and how to add them. Doctors wouldn't use it because they couldn't defend it in 
the inevitable lawsuits that would result after the model would have made a mistake. 
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task and the importance of configura I and broken-leg cues. There may be 
tasks in which experts beat models, but it is hard to think of examples. In 
pricing antiques, classic cars, or unusual real estate (e.g., houses over $5 
million), there may be many broken-leg cues that give experts an advantage, 
but a model including the expert-rated cue "special features" may also do 
well. 
Tasks involving pattern recognition, like judging the prospective taste of 
gourmet recipes or the beauty of faces or paintings, seem to involve many 
configural rules that favor experts. But if one adds expert-rated cues like 
"consistency" (in recipes) or "symmetry" (in faces) to linear models, the 
experts' configura] edge may disappear. 
Another class of highly configural tasks includes those in which variable 
weights change across subsamples or stages. For instance, one should play the 
beginning and end of a backgammon or chess game differently. A model that 
picks moves by evaluating position features, weighting them with fixed 
weights, and combining them linearly will lose to an expert who implicitly 
changes weights. But a model that could shift weights during the game could 
possibly beat an expert, and one did: Berliner'S (1980) backgammon program 
beat the 1979 world champion. 
There is an important need to provjde clearer boundaries for this dismal 
picture of expert judgment. To what extent, we ask ourselves, does the picture 
provided by this review apply to the other domains discussed in this volume? 
Providing a crisp answer to this question is difficult, because few of these 
domains provide explicit comparisons between experts and linear models. 
Without such a set of comparisons, identifying domains in which experts will 
do well is speculation. 
We have already suggested that some domains are inherently richer in 
broken-leg and configural cues. The presence of these cues provides the op-
portunity for better performance but does not necessarily guarantee it. In 
addition, the presence of feedback and the lack of noise have been suggested 
as important variables in determining the performances of both experts and 
expert systems (Carroll, 1987). Finally, Shanteau (1988) has suggested that 
"good" experts are those in whom the underlying body of knowledge is more 
developed, providing examples such as soil and livestock judgment. 
6. lMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF EXPERTISE 
Expertise should be identified by comparison to some standard of 
performance. Random and novice performances make for natural compari-
sons. The linear-model literature suggests that simple statistical models pro-
vide another, demanding comparison. 
The results from studies of expert decision making have had surprisingly 
little effect on the study of expertise, even in related tasks. For instance, 
simple linear models do quite well in medical-judgment tasks such as the 
hypothetical task discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Yet most of the 
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work in aiding diagnosis has been aimed at developing expert systems that can 
mimic human expert performance, not exceed or improve upon it. 
Expert systems may predict less accurately than simple models because the 
systems are too much like experts. The main lesson from the regression-model 
literature is that large numbers of configural rules, which knowledge engi-
neers take as evidence of expertise, do not necessarily make good predictions; 
simple linear combinations of variables (measured by experts) are better in 
many tasks. 
A somewhat ironic contrast between rule-based systems and linear models 
has occurred in recent developments in connectionist models. Whereas these 
models generally represent a relatively low level of cognitive activity, there 
are some marked similarities to the noncognitive "paramorphic" regression 
models we have discussed. In many realizations, a connectionist network is a 
set of units with associated weights that specify constraints on how the units 
combine the input received. The network generates weights that win maxi-
mize the goodness of fit of the system to the outcomes it observes in training 
(Rumelhart, McClelland, & PDP Research Group, 1986). 
In a single-layer system, each unit receives its input directly from the envi-
ronment. Thus, these systems appear almost isomorphic to simple regres-
sions, producing a model that takes environmental cues and combines them, 
in a linear fashion, to provide the best fit to the outcomes. Much like regres-
sions, we would expect simple, single-layer networks to make surprisingly 
good predictions under uncertainty (Jordan, 1986; Rumelhart et aI., 1986). 
More complex, multilayer systems allow for the incorporation of patterns of 
cues, which resemble the configural cues reported by experts. Like human 
experts, we suspect that such hidden units in these more complex systems will 
not add much to predictive validity in many of the domains we have discussed. 
The parallel between regression models and connectionist networks is pro-
vocative and represents an opportunity for bringing together two quite diver-
gent paradigms. 
Finally, we note that this chapter stands in strong contrast to the chapters 
that surround it: Our experts, while sharing many signs of superior expert 
processing demonstrated in other domains, do not show superior perfor-
mance. The contrast suggests some closing notes. First, the history of the 
study of expert decision making raises concerns about how experts are to be 
identified. Being revered as an expert practitioner is not enough. Care should 
be given to assessing actual performance. Second, the case study of decision 
making may say something about the development of expertise in general and 
the degree to which task characteristics promote or prevent the development 
of superior performance. Experts fail when their cognitive abilities are badly 
matched to environmental demands. 
In this chapter we have tried to isolate the characteristics of decision tasks 
that (1) generate such poor performance, (2) allow experts to believe that 
they are doing well, and (3) allow us to believe in them. We hope that the 
contrast between these conditions and those provided by other domains may 
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contribute to a broader, more informed view of expertise, accounting for 
experts' failures as well as their successes. 
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